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IN THE SU-PREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.Jiiii EDGAR
E \"EL 1rN EDGAR, his wife,

.J. \Y. EDG;\R,
alld

a, 1 lda

Plaintiffs and 1-lespondents~

Civil No.
10159

vs.
CO~IBINED

PRODUCTION ASSOCl/tTES, LTD., a Utah Corporation,

Defendant and .A.ppellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ST . . \TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for specific performance of an
alleged contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant. involving the sale of three unpatented mining
claims.

DISPOSITION OF LO"\VER COURT
This case was tried to the court at a pre-trial hearing. Frmn the summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
defendant appeals.
.)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE1\.L
Defendant seeks reversal of the judg1nent in faYor
of the plaintiffs and seeks judgment in its favor as a
matter of law, or that failing, a trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs brought this action to enforce the
document attached to plaintiffs' complaint and designated as Exhibit "A", to wit:
"Dec. 9 - 1962. Dear Ji1n Edgar & Evelyn
Edgar: In consideration of your signing that
document titled Amendment to Mining Lease &
Options, I will retbl!n you the $9000 note of
Combined Productic;-n Associates personally endorsed, due on June 15th, 1963
and at
that time you are to assign me your Blue Star
interest as evidenced by your contract. I sl Combined Production Associates, Ltd., A. B.
Thomas- Pres.
"The position of Blue Star, Blue Star No. 1
& Blue Star No. 2 - accepted by '""· E. Edgar,
'Villas L. Edgar & M. M. Edgar - is acceptable
to Combined Production Associates for the purpose of the contract on the ground titled "Amendment to Lease & Options". Is/ Combined Production Associates, A. B. Thomas- Pres." (R. 2A).
It appears from the pleadings, the answer to interrogatories and from the statements made at the pretrial hearing, that the mining claims in this suit, together
with a number of other claims owned by other parties,
were originally leased to M M & S Exploration Com-
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pany in .June, lD;')!l, and the lease was assigned to the
defendant.

The majority of the claims are owned by a family
ktHJ\\'ll as the :Edgars, and a dispute arose among them
a.'> to the lol'ation of the various claims in reference to
an ore body. Each owner "floated" his claim so that
caeh daitned the ownership of the mining claim upon
whieh the ore body was located. This dispute resulted
in a typil'al western claim-jumping fight, where threats
of force and violence and an exhibition of guns and
threats to use the same were demonstrated against the
lessee.
To settle the status of these claims, an amendment
to this lease was drawn and circulated among the owners
for their signa tt1res. The amended agreement provided,
"\\'hereas certain confusion exists in the location of the
respective groups of claims which cloud the title to said
elaims, . . . it is the desire of all parties to execute a
lease ... which will effectively protect said title." Article
XII provided:

XII
CO,TEN1-\.NT AS TO ADVERSE CLAIMS
AND STATUS OF TITLE
P ..:\RCEL I:
The parties hereto acknowledge that a dispute
has arisen between the First Parties and the
Second Parties as to the location of the claims
described in Parcel I, which affects the ownership of Parcel II. Prior to 45 days from date

5
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hereof, First Parties and Second Parties agree
to settle their differences and designate in writing
and by plat the agreed locations of the clain1s
described in Parcel I. As of such date, First
Parties and Second Parties covenant that the
persons then designated by them will be the sole
owners of the mining claims set forth in Parcel I,
subject only to the following:
The paramount title of the United States
and any cloud on the title which may have been
created by Third Parties.
PARCEL II:
As of the date designated in Parcel I, the I1..,irst
Parties and Secqnd Parties shall designate in
writing and by plat the agreed locations of the
claims described in Parcel II. As of such date,
First and Second Parties covenant that the persons designated by them will be the sole owners
of the mining claims set forth in Parcel II, subject only to the following:
The paramount title of the United States
and any cloud on the title which may have been
created by Third Parties. (R. 9).
At the time defendant approached the plaintiffs
for their signatures on the amended lease, all the parties
to the amended lease signed the lease and a pia t showing
the location of the claims in which each lessor had an
interest with the exception of Travis Edgar and his
wife. After a discussion between the plaintiffs and A. B.
Thmnas, president of the defendant company, the plaintiffs agreed to sell their interest in the claims for $10,000.00, and the defendant agreed to buy these claims

6
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i'or said sum. if the :unended lease and plat was signed
hr Travis Edgar and his wife. The memorandum Exhibit--~\" supra was signed and the defendant delivered
a l'hcl'k for $1,000.00 to the plaintiffs, with the understanding that it would not be cashed until Travis Edgar
and his wife had signed the amended lease and plat.
( l )lat H. 10). These discussions between the plaintiffs
and the president of the defendant company took place
itt .A. pache Junction, Arizona. Mr. Thomas returned to
Salt Lake City and sent one Robert Morris, a resident
of Elko, Nevada, to see Travis Edgar and his wife, who
resided at Albuquerque, New Mexico, to sign the
amended lease and plat.
~Ir.

Thomas sent the following telegram to the

plaintiffs:
''Thanks for everything. Morris leaves this
afternoon for Albuquerque. Check and note will
be good the 1ninute Travis signs, which should
be tmnorrow. \Vill work hard for a pay out to
you long before June 15th." (R. II).
~I orris

was caught in a snow storm in New Mexico
and did not return to Salt Lake City with the documents,
but went by bus to his home in Elko. He notified Mr.
Thomas that Travis Edgar had signed, but he neglected
to state that Travis Edgar and his wife had refused to
sign the plat. Mr. Thomas, believing that both documents had been signed by Travis Edgar and his wife,
sent plaintiffs the following telegram:
"Travis has signed. Deposit check, note will
reach you in few days." (R. 12).

7
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A few days later, ~Ir. Thmnas learned fron1 ~'lr.
l\1orris that the plat had not been signed. 1\Ir. Thoula:-i
telephoned this information to the plaintiffs, "vho, in
the meantime, had cashed the $1,000.00 check, and
requested the return of the money. The plaintiffs refused to refund the money, claiming it as a pay1nent
for the trouble they had gone. to in this matter and for
trips they had made to the property.
The plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action
and at a pre-trial hearing the court entered a sumrnary
judgment against the defendant for the sum of
$9,000.00, plus interest and costs. The plaintiffs had
promised to insert in the findings and judgment that
upon payment of this sum, the defendant would be
entitled to a deed of the claims owned by the plaintiffs.
( R. 33-4) . This was not done and an ordinary j udgment for damages has been entered against the defendant for the sum of $9,738.70, although the action was
based upon a contract for the sale of three 1nining
claims.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT.
The contract upon which this suit is based, to 1vit,
Exhibit "A", without oral evidence is ambiguous, uncertain and unintelligent and, therefore, unenforceable.
8

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.Assuming that Exhibit ".1\'' is a binding obligation
between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the perfol'lnalll'e of said ~ontract \vas contingent upon the signing
of the alllcnded lease and plat by Travis Edgar and his
wife. The second paragraph of Exhibit "A" states:
"The position of the Blue Star, Blue Star No. 1 and
Blue Star No. 2 accepted by W. E. Edgar, 'Villis L.
I~:dgar and J. ~1. Edgar is acceptable to Combined
Production i\._ssociates ... " This language indicates
that the defendant was concer.p.ed about the location
1lf lhe three mining claims. The telegram attached to
the pleadings, Exhibit 2, clearly indicates that the purchase of the daims was based upon securing the signalures of Travis Edgar and his wife. When Thomas sent
the telegrmn, Exhibit 2, to the plaintiffs and stated:
"l\Iorris leaves this afternoon for Albuquerque. Check
and note will be good the minute signed, which should
be tomorrow ... ",and on December 15, 1962, another
telegram was sent to the plaintiffs, Exhibit 3, which
stated: ··'TraYis has signed. Deposit check. Note will
reach you within a few days," indicates that there was
no deal until the signatures of Travis Edgar and his
wife were secured. The check was cashed on December
19. 19()2. The plaintiffs clearly understood after they
had signed the amendment to the lease that it was
necessar~- that the various owners of the claims settle
their differences within 45 days after the signing of
said amendrnent. This is supported by Article XII,
which, muong other things, states: "That prior to 45
da~-s frorn date hereof, First Parties and Second Parties

9
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agree to settle their differences and designate in writing
and by plat the agreed locations of the clai1ns ... ''.
This agreement has never been fulfilled by the owners
of the claims, nor have all of the owners of the clai1ns
signed the plat agreeing to the location of the claims.
That it was the understanding and the intention of
the parties that Exhibit "B" was not a binding agreement until Travis Edgar had signed the plat is ad1nitted
by the plaintiffs in their answer to interrogatories. Defendants propounded the following interrogatory:
"5. Is it not a fact that the alleged contract
Exhibit "A" attached to your complaint was
contingent upon all the owners of the Blue Star
claims settling within 45 days their differences
and designate in writing and by plat the agreed
locations of the Blue Star claims?" (R. 6).
Answer:
"5. In answer toN o. 5-No. It was contingent
only upon Travis Edgar approving the plat, locating the mining claims. Later on, Defendant,
Thomas, represented in his telegrmn (a copy of
which has been attached as an Exhibit to Plaintiffs' Answer to Request for More Definite
Statement), that Travis Edgar had signed."
(R. 10).
We do not believe that any reasonable person
woudl agree to pay $10,000.00 for three unpatented
mining claims without knowing where they were located.
The defendant did not have an opportunity to present
to the Judge at the pre-trial conference the facts and
circumstances surrounding this agreement, nor was it

10
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ullowed to present any oral testimony to explain Exhibit "A_'' and the intention of the parties concerning
the same.
.As lhe evidence now stands, the summary judgmcll t for the plaintiffs cannot stand and the same should
be set aside and judgment of dismissal should be entered in fa ,·or of the defendant.

POINT ~. THAT PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE
OF ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS AND U'NENFORCEABLE FOR
LACK OF MUTUALITY.
The contract upon which plaintiffs' cause of action
is based has never been signed by the plaintiffs. There
is no evidence of any kind, oral or written, in the records
that plaintiffs, at the time of the delivery of Exhibit
··.A'' by Thomas to them, were legally bound to perform
on their part. In other words, there is a lack of mutuality
and specifiic performance should not be granted where
the vendor is not bound by the contract.
Plaintiffs' action is barred by the Statute of Frauds
because the contract was not signed by the plaintiffs,
the parties making the sale.
)fining claims are deemed to be real estate and
subject to statute of frauds; 37 C.J.S. para. 83, p. 588.
In 25-5-3, U.C.A. 1953, relating to leases and
contracts for interest in lands, it is provided:
11
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"Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands,
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or 1ne1noranduin thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party by ~whmn
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing."
In 37 C.J.S., page 699, it is stated:
"In a number of jurisdictions the statute relating to contracts for the sale of land expressly
requires the signing by, and only by, the party
making the sale."
A vendor who has not signed a contract or a meinorandum or the contract of sale cannot enforce the contract against the purchaser; Clark vs. Holrnan~ 170
N.W. 23; Ducett vs. Wolf~ 45 N.W. 829; Maynard vs.
Brown~ 2 N.W. 30. The above are Michigan cases.
The rule is also held in Kentucky, see [(latch vs.
Simpson~ 34 S.W. 2d 95; Smith vs. Ballou~ 277 S.W.
286.

The rule is also supported In Tennessee; Ashley

vs.

Preston~

39 S.W. 2d., 279.

In 49 Am. J ur. 383, it is stated:
"In some instances, the statutes require leases
or contracts for the sale of an interest in land to
be signed by the party by whom the lease or sale
is made, leaving the contract so signed binding
on the lessee or purchaser, although not signed
by him, but not binding on either party unless
signed by the vendor.''

12
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In Bailey 'l'.V. Leishman, 32 Utah 128, 89 Pac. 78,
a suit was on the contract for the sale of seed signed by
sellers. The court in its application of the statutes of
fraud, states:
"'I'he requiretnent to subscribe or sign the
Inetnorandutn is purely statutory and our statute
requires that the party to be charged only ne~d
subscribe. This, it has often been held, applies
to the vendor in case of sale. The weight of
authority is clf<\lrly to this effect."
In 1l!oen vs. IJ{inzel, Idaho, 313 Pac. 2nd 1079,
upholds the rule that the contract to be enforceable
must be signed by the vendor.
In Steel vs. Duntley, 1 Pac. 2d 999, California, the
:1ppellant con1plained that the contract was not signed
by the \'endee and was within the statute of frauds. The
court stated:
"This is not the requirement of the law. The
party to be charged is the only one who must
sign, and in the situation before us, that is the
vendor who did sign."
POI~T 3.

THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED
TO TENDER A DEED TO THE CLAIMS OR
SHOlV O'YNERSHIP OF THE CLAIMS AT
THE TI~IE OF THE HEARING .
. ..-\. n action to recover the purchase price is a substitute for a bill to enforce specific performance for the
sale of the land. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs
owned the 1nining claims at the time of the pre-trial
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hearing, either by abstract of title or by oral testi;nony.
No deed or conveyance to said claims has been tendered
or offered. The judgment against the defendant did
not provide therein that upon payment of the judgrnent
defendant would be entitled to conveyance of the min"
ing claims. If defendant pays the judgment, it gets
no interest or ownership in these claims. Under the
present proce edings, the plaintiffs can recover judgment for $9,738.70 and still keep the clairns.
In 92 C.J.S., page 449, it is stated:
"An action at law by the vendor for the unpaid
purchase price of an executory contract of sale
is in effect an action for specific performance of
the contract, and should therefore be governed
by the same equitable principles."
In 92 C.J.S., page 457, it is stated:
"Where the covenants as to the payment of the
purchase price or a portion thereof, and as to the
conveyance of the title, are mutual and depend"
ent, the vendor cannot maintain an action for
the purchase price without first conveying or
tendering a deed, or offering to do so, or, in jurisdictions -where that is a sufficient tender, allege
a readiness and willingness to perform, as dis"
cussed infra 481 ; and if the purchaser dies during the continuance of such contract the tender
rnust be made to his heirs. Thus, a delivery or
tender of a deed must be made as a condition to
the right to recover purchase rnoney due where
the conveyance and payment are to be made at
the same time, as where the vendor agrees to
convey on payment of the purchase price or a
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portion thereof. Where the vendor binds ~ims~lf
to make a deed when the purchaser requires It,
and after the whole of the purchase money falls
due the purchaser offers to pay it, and demands ·
a deed, the vendor cannot maintain an action for
the money without having tendered a proper
conveyance."
In Stct,cns vs.

Irwin~ 231

Pacfic, 783, it is stated:

"The rule seems to be that a vendor under an
executory contract of sale may maintain an action for the purchase price, but where his suit is
for all of the balance of the purchase price he
must offer to perform the obligations iinposed
upon him by tendering and bringing into court
a deed of conveyance to the property, because the
vendor is not entitled to have both the land and
a judgment for the purchase price."

CONCLUSION
In conclusion Appellant submits that the lower
court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs and the judgment of the trial court
should be reversed and the case dismissed.
Respectfully

~ubmitted,

H. G. METOS
Attorney for Appellant
404 Boston Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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